Suggested Strategies for fightingPublic Sector Corruption in Uganda

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Abstract

This article explores the strategies for fighting public sector corruption in Uganda based on review of secondary data. The study was underpinned by The Principal-Agent theory (PAT) that portrays the agency problem (agency costs). The study approach was qualitative, based on systematic desktop study which minimized bias within the process and ensured academic rigor that helped to arrive at a dependable conclusion. The research question was: What are strategies for fighting public sector corruption in Uganda? The study found that public sector corruption has been perpetuated by public servants, despite all the legal instruments in place meant that guide them into maintaining professional work ethics. The study concluded that corruption remains a real threat to many governments across the world and yet its exact is measure problematic, at times impossible owing to its vague delineations that oversimplify the act. However, this study provided key insights, and a basis for other scholars to conduct further empirical studies. The study implication is that, issues of public sector corruption should not be oversimplified because they are directly linked to the society, and cannot be detached from the process of theorization.

Key words: *Public sector corruption, Corruption in Uganda, Strategies of fighting public sector corruption*

Introduction

Corruption remains an obstacle to socio-economic development (SED), and a huge barrier to poverty reduction in Uganda andother poor and less developed countries. Public sector corruption (PSC) includes corruption of the political process, and of government agencies such as the police, judiciary, as well as corruption in processes of allocating public funds for service delivery. The act of corruption is immoral, dishonest, criminal and unethical undertaken by a person or organization entrusted with a position of authority who engaged in it for illicit benefit (Locatelli,Mariani,Sainati,Tristano& Marco, 2017).

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Corruption remains a major challenge to the attainment of the twin goals of ending extreme poverty by the year 2030, and enhancing collective prosperity for the poorest 40 percent of persons in less developed countries (LDCs). Reducing corruption is at the center of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)which aim at improving the welfare of the poor and most vulnerable people, cut costs, and increase access to political goods such as: education, health, security, and justice among others. The majority of the poor people across the globe particularly LDCs, pay the most percentage of their income as bribes to be able to access social services.Additionally, there is a breakdown of social contract, massive creation of inequalities, and growing discontent of the majority of citizens in corrupt countries. Consequently, corruption deters foreign investments in any country due to the waning of confidence in the government resulting into poor SED and growth for any economy (Hamilton, 2017).

There are many mechanisms and legal instruments drafted to fight corruption across the globe (including in Uganda). Nonetheless, of some the frameworks are viewed by many as "one size fits all" designed by international institutions like: The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) among others for LDCs.The "will" to fight or condemn public corruption remains weak despite extensive public outcry(Locatelli, Mariani, Sainati, Greco & Marco, 2017). Effective anti-corruption strategies are to be generated by a "coalition" of concerned people including: political leaders, key government officials, the private sector, citizens, communities, civil society organizations (CSOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) among others through use of modern technologies (Jensen &Malesky, 2017). This study explores strategies for fighting public sector corruption in Uganda. The keyquestions addressed were:

1) How is corruption generally conceptualized?
2) What is the overview of public sector corruption in Uganda?
3) What are the strategies for fighting public sector corruption?

The sections of this article include: conceptualization of corruption, theory of corruption, overview of corruption cases in Uganda, strategies for fighting public sector corruption, the methodology, conclusion and policy implication of the study.

Conceptualization of corruption

Corruption is "the abuse of entrusted power for private gain" (Transparency International, 2009). According to The World Bank Group (2012), corruption is seen as "the misuse of a public office for private benefit".The causes of corruption range from political, economic, social-cultural, technological, environmental to legal issues among others (Dimant&Tosato, 2017). Accordingly, other causes of PSC may include but not limited to: greed of money, supremacy, luxury or any materialistic desires; high levels of political monopolization of markets; weak democracy, citizen participation, and low political transparency; high levels of bureaucracy, and poor administrative structures; limited freedoms (press, expression, economic, and speech); high levels of nepotism, tribalism and ethical differences; weak rule of law, legal profession and judicial independence; high poverty levels; weak accounting practices; political instability; low levels of education; poor civic engagement; weak property rights; gender disparity; poor pay; lack of protection of whistleblowers (informers); and poor/lack of benchmarking practices among others have been (Butscher, 2012). Nevertheless, critics argued that the above causes of corruption are not grounded on facts and they vaguely define corruption and its causes. Further, these causes can only explain corruption in a particular country context and not in all countries that suffer the vice. Although theories and prospective systems remain the best for explaining corruption, other confounding factors not entirely been well explored, thus, making anti-corruption strategies unsuccessful in most cases (Mantzaris&Tsekeris, 2014).

The scale of corruption includes: petty, grand, and systemic. Petty corruption occurs at a smaller scale and takes place at the implementation end of public services when public officials meet the public in places such as: police stations, license issuing offices, and other government and private sectors. Then, grand corruption happens at the highest levels of government particularly in undemocratic countries or abusive government or governments with inadequate policing of corruption. Systemic corruption also called endemic corruption, is primarily caused by weaknesses of an organization or process encouraged by factors such as: incompatible inducements, unrestricted powers, monopolistic tendencies, poor pay, lack of transparency and a philosophy of impunity (Dimant&Tosato, 2017).

Methods or acts of corruption include but not limited to: bribery, kickbacks, embezzlement or illegal practices and other less visible exchanges such as: favors, gifts, promises, and secret handshakes (or envelops with cash), exchange of sexual favors, money, company shares, gifts, entrainment, preferential or special treatment, blackmail, fraud, graft,

networking (or patronage), offering of employment, and political benefit among others, which perpetuates more corruption. Other acts are: abuse of discretion (or the misuse of power and making of unfair decisions in favor of the preferred entity in courts of law), nepotism and tribalism, formation of unholy or also called "evil" alliances (they may not necessarily be illegal) but dangerous to public interest and based on hidden gains, preferential treatment as appreciation for facilitating corruption, involvement in organized criminal activities like: human, gun, and drug trafficking, environmental crimes, money laundering acts, and terrorism among others (Dimant&Tosato, 2017).

Further, corruption is also committed through engaging of a public servant in acts such as intimidation, violence, bullying, and harassment to mention but a few. Thus, acts of corruption expedite continued secrecy and is a positively stimuli for corruption tendencies (Hamilton, 2017).The effects of corruptionrange from among others: political (which undermines universal values including like: democracy and good governance), economic, socially, technological, and environmental to legal which all undermines effective and efficientpublic service delivery in such countries (Dimant&Tosato, 2017).

A Theory of Corruption

The Principal-Agent Theory (PAT)was advanced by Michael Jensen and William Mecklingin the 1970s. It attempts to explain the agency problem (or agency cost), where parties in cooperation have different goals, information, and division of labor, making the agency relationship ubiquitous. Government as (the principal) delegates work to the civil servants (called an agent) who does the work on behave of the principal in a contract that binds the relationship (Mitnick, 2006).The two basic assumptions of this theory are: that conflict of goals exists between the principals and agents, and that the agentspossess extra information than their principals, subsequently resulting in an information asymmetry between them. However, the PAT does not explain how to motivate the agent to induce them to act in the best interest of the principal. This leaves the agent with information advantage over the principal which automatically results in a conflict of interest despite the contract. This dilemma causes two obstacles to the effective contractual performance: that of moral danger and adverse selection (Hongxia, 2011). Nonetheless, the PAT is strong in explaining that agents (the civil servants) want to make as much money as they can, while, the principal (government) on the other side wants to pay agents as low as possible for the services of the agent. Hence,in a contractual relationship, the principals' maximum interest

cannot certainly contribute to the agents' maximum interest. The agent is at a disadvantages for example: being paid less benefits and other compensations. Therefore, the government (or principal) has to encourage its civil servants (or agent) to achievethe principals' goals at a minimum cost, although, this remains a challenge, and continues to promote corruption in governments of those corrupt countries (Voorn,Van Genugten& Van Thiel, 2019).

Overview of corruption cases in Uganda

Uganda has many unpleasant cases of corruption in almost all sectors of the government (Musaazi, 2018). This study alone cannot identify all these cases. However, a few prominent ones that caused public outcry are: Judicial (or court) corruption which is linked to judges who receive bribes to decide cases in favor of the guilt who pay money to buy their freedom. Innocent people end up being sentenced or punished wrongly. In Uganda, corruptionin the court system is perpetuated by the statemainly because of the limited judicial budget that is largely controlled by the cabinet leading to high financially dependence and low pay among others. Uganda's judicial systems is highly threatened by corruption characterized by bribery, nepotism, and political intrusion among others (Olken&Pande, 2012).Almost half of Ugandans identify the judicial system as corrupt, and about half of those that have come into contact with the courts paid bribes particularly in lower courts, something that continues to hampers the administration of justice (Kiyonga, 2016). Other major causes of judicial corruption related to: low pay, poor staffing and inadequate government funding. High levels of corruption in the "holy temples of justice" causes procedural delays (Hamilton, 2017). The former Chief Justice of Uganda Bart Katureebeseverally admitted that there is high magnitude of corruption in the court system and the society at large. More training, career progression, increasing salaries of judicial officers (aimed at eliminating "unofficial" ways of soliciting money from citizens), and taking administrative reforms among others are still much neededin fighting judicial corruption (Otage, 2018).

Police corruption is associated with the misconduct of police officers or members of the police force intended to achieve monetary benefits, career advancement, and personal desire in exchange for messing up investigationsor irregular arrests or protection of certain individuals from facing accountability (Wang, 2017). Some criminals pay some members of the UPF (both lower and higher ranked officials) a "protection fee" to perpetuate wrong

doing without being arrested (Kato, 2016). Internal police corruption in the UPF is a challenge to winning public trust, violation of legal and human rights, poor cohesion of departmental policies, and reliability in the institution mandated to protect law and order (protection of life and property) of the citizens. According to the UBOS report (2015), three out of every four Ugandans perceived the police to be corrupt. The UPF is among the top in the country's most corrupt institutions, but very few members of this force are investigated or even arrested for acts of corruption(Nassaka, 2015).

The Uganda Bureau of Statistic (UBOS) conducted a study titled "National Service Delivery Survey of 2015" which showed that 75% of Ugandans associated the members of UPF to taking bribes, extortion, engaging in fraud and other forms of corruption ranking the institution as the most corrupt in the country(Abdur, 2016). Under Section 70 of the Police Act 303, there is an official form available for lodging complaint/s against a police officer who has among others: violated human rights and actedor behaved unprofessionally. The form mandates any person prejudice to any other legal means of redress available to him or her, to make a written complaint as to: (a) report instance of bribery, corruption, oppression or intimidation by a police officer; (b) any neglect or non-performance of his or her duties by a police officer; (c) any other misconduct by a police officer.The few available mechanisms are frustrating since a police officer finds it hard to investigate or arrest a fellow officer for crime or any misconduct. Thus, the public has given up on reporting members of the UPFfor acts of corruption (Mwenda, 2016).

Corruption is also rife in Uganda's public services sector. There is widespread corruption being now accepted as a "means of getting by" in Uganda. Bribes, kickbacks, emblements of public funds, networking, sexual favors, money exchange, violence and intimidation among others rate high in this sector to get public services delivered despite public outcry. About two of every five Ugandans have ever paid a bribe to get a public service (Mwenda, 2016). Human resource recruitment is highly political and bureaucracy. For example, more than 5,500 "ghost workers" were deleted from the public service payroll in Uganda (Rumney, 2016). Additionally, the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) is mandated with screening applications, attend to complaints, and helps foreign investors obtain necessary permits. However, permits in Uganda take two times as many steps as compared to the regional average, and yet the total time required is actually in line with the regional averages (Ladu, 2016).

There is also high corruption risks in tax administration in Uganda. The Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) is the chief collector of government taxes. The URA introduced a new electronic system called the Electronic Cargo Tracking System (ECTS) that cost $5.2m (about Shs 13bn) aimed at improving efficiency and effectiveness of public service delivery (Ssempogo, 2013). However, tax collection remains a major problemthat lacks transparency given its unfair rules (vague and must be subjected to subject to change). Bribes and some other irregular payments during tax payments have continued to manifest against URA officials. Some URA officials than collect taxes for government are engaged in serious taking of bribes, kickbacks and other forms of corruption which highly affects the informal. The formal sector and those who can pay bribes get served better despite new technology recently installed at the URA (Ssempogo, 2013).Closely related is corruption in customs administration which continues to be a key area of interest. Uganda's custom (borders and airports) is not transparent, but marred with irregular and illegal payments during the processes of exporting and important. Border corruption is listed among the top problem for importers. The clearance process is flawed with corruption tendencies like payment of bribes and kickbacks for purposes of under declaring of taxes. Those who do not pay such monies get their goods intentionally delayed which results in loss of time, revenue and general frustration and stress (Kanaabi, 2015).

Corruption in land administration in Uganda is still very high despite the Catherine BamugemereireCommission of Inquiry into land issues established by the President of the Republic of Uganda and the commission registered 1,380 complaints in land row cases within its first two weeks of commencing work. Most of the cases included: forgery of certificates of title, land snatching, and non-availability of land officials,bribery, overlaps in land rights, extortion and black mail against land officers, and forgery of titles among others (Atwijukire, 2018).The Uganda land laws are still complex, there is a lot of non-transparency in the land registry offices across the country characterized by fraud, poor information systems for land registration, frustration of foreign companies that want to acquire land for investments (these are not accorded the same opportunity like the local companies). This has caused a lot of land disputes with some losing their lives and property in the fight for ownership (Transparent International Uganda, 2017).

There ishigh corruption risks reported in most government procurements in Uganda. The Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act 1 of 2003 set up the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) as the primary regulatory frame for public procurement and disposal of public assets in Uganda. The amendments to the PPDA introduced numerous changes among them is the consolidation and enrichment of the role of PPDA in the implementation of its regulatory mandate (PPDA Act, 2003). However, the procurement process in Uganda is marred with awarding bogus contractsin exchange for bribes, gifts, company shares, employment opportunities, preferential treatments, sexual favors, and kickbacks among others (Keith, Vitasek, Manrodt, & Kling, 2016). Public procurement is among the most susceptible to corruption in Uganda with an approximation 9.4 percentage of contract values lost in form of corruption at the levels of local and central government. There is lack of transparency with politicians influencing huge financial deals. Open bidding for provision of works in service is required from anything exceeding UGX 500 while UGX 200million for goods. For projects with lower value, restrictive bidding is used, where the government uses a system of open bidding than send out direct invitations or advertising the tender. There is mainly inadequacy of information availed to the public specifically on the steps tobe used to assess bids (Mwenda, 2016).

There is corruption that has highly manifested in the natural resources sector in Uganda. There is not adequate levels of transparency and disclosure of financials information to the public resulting into irregularities. The flow of information on oil exploitation is unsteady which creates doubts as to if all Ugandans will benefit alike (of if the crude oil will serve a common good) from this natural resource. There are fears that the crude oil may trap Uganda into a "natural resourcecurse" or the paradox of plenty (Venables, 2016).Hefty bonuses were paid to government officials who deal with tax disputes with international oil firms. Additionally, the mines department is also corrupt especially when it comes to securing licenses for protected wildlife areas (Ross, 2012). As a result, The President of Uganda was forced to terminate a USD 175 million mining project after it emerged that a former minister had taken a bribe of 1 million USD million from a Chinese company that had been granted the license to mine (Mugerwa, 2017).

Strategies for fighting public sector corruption

Globally, the impact of corruptionon public service delivery performance and alleviation of poverty has been extensively acknowledged. Corruption has been associated as an

indicator of bad governance(Rotberg, 2014). Corruption requires clearly identifying the causes of being misgoverned. However, the list of options of possiblecauses of actions to curb corruption is very enormous. A standard framework (or a one size fits all) may not be best, but how corruption is conceptualized and theorized can help determine empirical understandings of what works, and what does not work in the circumstance of specific countries (Kroeze, Kerkhoff&Corni, 2013)

The significance of an effective anti-corruption strategies has been recently expanded by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) into a global political agenda supported by the World Bank and the United Nations (The World Bank Group, 2012).Nonetheless, there is no single model that has been approved as being the best for fighting the increasing rate of corruption in most governments. Some suggested anti-corruption strategies are:

An independent judicial system could reduce corruption considerably.Although judicial officials mostly in LDCs are poorly motivated (low pay, poor working conditions and blackmail among others), formalizing the legal system, reforming the judicial structures, and increasing the independence of the judiciary remains key (Vogl, 2012). Judicial procedures have to be simplified and clarified for better case management, improve transparency and access to judicial information can help to reduce corruption related tendencies.Conversely, a seemingly too independent judiciary can result into abuse of power by judges and lack of accountability. Corruption can influence the decisions of judges if there is no proper checks and balances in place to avert this abuse of power (Corwin, 2014).

Strengthening citizen (or public) participation also called P2 is recognized as a political practice and a right. Citizen participation highly seeks and enables the engagement of those possibly affected by anti-corruption policies or those interested in them (including individuals, governments, institutions, companies or any other entities) that attracts public interests. Hence, the principle of citizen participation holds that those affected by a decision have a right to be engaged in the decision-making process. Their contribution can influence a decision through social capital. The process of citizen participation empowers people, and is part of a good governance centered on "people" and follows the approach of "people first" (Musaazi, 2018). In 1990, the African Charter for Popular Participation in

Development and Transformation emphasized the role of citizen participation in economic and human development. At the international level, the International Association for Public Practitioners was founded in response to the raising interest in the practice of corruption. This resulted into the establishment of the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) to enhance accountability and transparence in governments. The key argument of citizen participation is based on the fact that the participating communities can hold public authorities accountable in the implementation of public service (Roffee, 2017).

A rational civil servant recruitment and promotion system can be an effective strategy in curbing corruption. The civil service as an independent body of government is majorly made of career bureaucrats (or public servants) recruited on proficiency, and not appointed or elected, although their officialterm of officetypically survives on transitions of political leadership. A civil servant therefore, is a person fully employed in the public sector on behalf of a government agency or department. They chiefly represent the interests of citizens, although the extent varies from one country to another. Civil servants have to be recruited and promoted by a clearly known mechanism that is transparent and open (within a known legal and labor framework). The challenge with this is that the legal framework provides for a vigorous ground for ensuring that the merit principles of professionalism, integrity, independence, transparency, political impartiality, and service to the public are translated into practice in fair and dynamism. This among others improves bureaucratic capability and based on patronage (Diaby&Sylwester, 2014).

In addition, the merit system is divided broadly into "career systems" which ensures initial entry to the civil service is centered on the knowledge of the candidates (a relevant university degree or academic credentials) with transfers and promotion within the civil service. The other is "position-based systems" which focuses on choosing the best-suited candidate for each position to be filled. The civil service commission is mandated to among others: regulate the employment and working conditions of public servants, supervisethe hire and promotions of civil servants based on their ability to perform at their work,and promote public service values (Burbank, Cooper, 2010). Civil service reform mostly in LDCs can highly improve the efficiency, effectiveness, representativity, professionalism, democratic and good governance persona of public servants which all can largely improve the provision of public goods and services with increased accountability (Olken&Pande, 2012). It only requires proper data collection, analysis, organizational

streamlining, adopting best human resource methods and training among others (Rose-Ackerman, 2013).

Improving financial accountability can streamline administrative processes in government. Increasing awareness of the need for better performance and greater accountability in public financial management (PFM) systems has forced many countries to design means of fighting corruption. According to Ian (2017), there are five key methods to improve public financial accountability including: 1) ensure accrual accounting which is part of a whole PFM system to provide an accurate financial picture. The information collected has to be used as evidence for machined informed decision. Reporting on cash in and out alone is not enough, but looking at assets and liabilities can help provide a more comprehensive and accurate picture of the financial position of an organization. Again, these numbers have to be used for making fiscal and budgetary decisions for better allocation of resources, improved financial resilience, improved financial risk, and transparency. 2) Adopting the use of a whole systems approach to improve scrutiny. This PFM model warrants that the components of a PFM system function in a steady and mutually-reinforcing manner. A whole systems approach ensures that all the key features of a vigorous PFM system fits into a single framework, one that ensures the system functions in an effective and coherent manner. This can be done by combine the budgeting and accounting functions in a more effective and logicalmethod. 3) The use of big data and analytics to reduce tolerance of corruption and strengthen the fight against corruption. This helps further identify and reduces corruption related behaviors and fraudulent activities within political systems. 4) Provide and publish public government financial statements (based on accruals), combined with providing financial position of governments expenditure regularly. 5) Ensure proper planning for reforming the PFM systems to help governments afford needed resources provided for within the legal framework. Effective implementation of results into improved performance within the sector, in turn improves trust and confidence in political institutions.Thus, accountability is generally concerned with blameworthiness, answerability, liability, and the expectation of account-giving for actions, decisions, products, and politics (Thompson, 2014).

Creating openness and transparency in government spending is among the best anti-corruption strategies. Openness is characterized by transparency, free and unrestricted access to information and knowledge as a right can among others assist create

collaboration in management and decision making founded on a participatory bottom-top approach which is a good strategy for avoiding secretive central authority decision making. Transparency is about operating in a manner that makes it easy for others to see what actions are taken. It is concerned with communication, accountability, openness and trust among others(Michael, 2015). Openness and transparency are basic requirements in building accountability and trust in active democracies, and also promotes good governances coupled with free market economies that can go a long way in fighting corruption. For example, New Zealand is ranked the best in implementing openness and transparency in its budget processes, provision of subsidies, tax exemptions, public procurement of goods and services among others after the country approved its Fiscal Responsibility Act (1994). This Act provides is a legal tool upon which the management of resources is done in a transparent manner, something that deters malfeasance and abuse of public resources. Countries with credible budget controls systems benefit from such policies and make a difference as a corrupt free government, promotes free media, improved levels of schooling, build infrastructure, active civil society, citizenparticipation, and fight poverty at all levels of government (Emmanuel & Dieter, 2018).

Increasingthe chances and amounts of paying penaltiesand employment of harsh methods to deter corruption in governments. Courts have to come up with very stringent penalties including: high monetary payments, long jail sentences, death sentences, disgracefully being fired from work, naming and shaming those (both individuals and organizations) who steal government money and their families among others for violation of corruption laws by civil servants. Such harsh punishments for those found guilty of the act can be a deterrence mechanism for potential victims to rethink engaging in acts of corruption. Penalties such as: injections, forfeiture of assets, disgorgement of profits, and suspension from work (if suspected or convicted of indulging in corruption) or in case of an organization suspension and in extreme cases banning such entities from doing business with the government forever. This however requires a competence police (or investigative department) that can collect substantive evidence for court use to help pin down the victim'shands down and be denied bail (Jiangnan, 2012).

Promoting press freedom (or open press)and freedom of speech for all can be a very powerful tool that restrains corruption. The Constitution of Uganda under Article (29) stipulates that "every person shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression

which shall include freedom of the press and other media". Respecting of these freedoms can boost the wider freedoms of speech, expression and media for both the individual and public among others(The World Bank Group, 2012). However, this freedom can be limited or even abused, for example,NBS TV's celebrated investigative journalism and media personality Solomon Sserwanja'shouse was surrounded by security officers (police and army among others) for having investigated a story on drug thefts in government hospitals in Uganda, but he was not found at home. However, his wife Vivian NakallikaSserwnja(who is also the communication officer in the Ministry of Health in Uganda -MOH), and BBC journalists: Kassim Mohammed and Rashid Kaweesa, and Godfrey Badebya, a cameraman were arrested. These were arrested in Kampala Makindye Divisionin early days of February, 2019 for unlawful possession of classified drugs contrary to Section 27(2) of the National Drug Authority (NDA) cap 206. Police spokesperson Patrick Onyango confirmed that they were found with 14 boxes of Lumefantine tablets, vaccines for Hepatitis drugs, and other drugs labeled with government seals (Aine, 2019). But in a statement issued by the MOH, they expressed shock over drug theft rackets. The MOH come out to support any efforts aimed at exposing government officials who steal and sell drugs to the pubic (Kungu, 2019).

Nonetheless, journalists continue to face such intimidation and harassment from the state and non-state actors which threaten their confidence levels. The media setting in Uganda is generally open and critical, although most media houses continue to face pressure of closure from the government for "bad reporting" against the government. Some media houses have bowed to this pressure by censoring news. They fear close and being denied government adverting which fetches a lot of money for media houses to survive. In addition, some governmentofficials also bribejournalists so that they do not publish bad stories of corruption against them in the media; the government has also restricted the use of Internet by introducing unfair taxes, arresting some people for using social media to expose governmentofficials who are corrupt; the government persistently harasses civil society groups (break into their offices at night, blocking their bank accounts, arresting some of their members, and constantly monitoring and evaluating their activities in Uganda among others) that advocate for fighting againstPSC (Dimant&Tosato, 2017).

The moral character and quality of government officials can act as a deterrence to PSC. Moral quality of civil servants can promote virtues such as: courage, resilience, empathy,

honesty, and loyalty, or of good ethical behaviors or habits (Peter, 2015).According toAlemiga&Mwogeza (2018), moral character refers to a disposition to express behavior (or the collection of qualities that distinguish one individual from another) in consistent patterns of functions across a range of situations. These are the "sum of one's moral habits and dispositions" among them includes proper behaviors or etiquette based on a body of ethical standards or values/principles derived from a code of conduct of a particular philosophy, religion or culture. Therefore,morality is about rightness or goodness of a person (George, 2017).The quality of a civil servant based on impartiality in the execution of their duties remains key in fighting this form of corruption. Moral qualities such as: integrity, continuous learning agility, flexibility, fearlessness, being a great motivator, change managers, strong communicator, being visionary, collaborator, and accessible among others remain key in fighting PSC in Uganda. Leaders must have strategies that boost their moral qualitiesfor better improvement of their personality (Kassin, Fein & Markus, 2017).

Improvement of management skills in the public sector can result into better (or informed or evidence based) public service delivery decisions. Key skills such as: human skills, technical skills, andconceptual skillscoupled with abilities such as: effective communication, negotiation tactics, quick response behavior, administrative, and leadership problem solvingamong others will go a long way in curbing PSC in Uganda (Waring, 2016). The government has to fully adopt new public administration and management (Nigro, 2014), to ensure public servants understand, develop, and deploy people who have ability and competences in (planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, budgeting and reporting), they must have qualification and experience (based on merit and can manage key resources), and not through "know who technique" at all levels of management can seriously improve ways of curbing PSC and also increase responsiveness and awareness of how government works (Holmes, 2012)

Among other strategies that can be of used are: cutting bureaucratic red tape through bureaucratic reformswhich encourage the use of extreme regulation (rigid conformity) to formal rules (Dickson, 2015), substituting regressive and distorting subsidies with targeted cash transfers (Hope, Gilding & Alvarez, 2015), establishing international conventions against corruption for example the one that equal the OECD's Anti-Bribery Convention, and The UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) of 2005 ratified by 140 signatories

by late 2013 (Jensen &Malesky, 2017), use of smart technology (Internet) to promote more of an arms-length relationship between officials and civil society (Mumford, 2010).

Methodology

The research approach was qualitative: data was collected using desk top study method specifically focused on systematic review of data that concerns public sector corruption (Howell, 2013). This was done precisely and helped access secondary data, but minimizing bias within the process. It was also quite quick, less costly, and the greatest of the basic information was readily available on the Internet which could be used for benchmarking in the research procedure. This resulted into a vigorous and reliable use of evidence so as to arrive at a dependable conclusion. The documents used included: government reports, cabinet papers and minutes, magazines, books, and journal articles among others on the study topic on: the concept, theory, causes, effects, types, scale, methods, overview of corruption in the public sector in Uganda, strategies of fighting this corruption, conclusions and recommendations were all available (Silverman, 2011).

Conclusion

Corruption remains a real threat to many governments especially the poor and LDCs across the world. The exact measure of corruption is problematic if not impossible owing to the illicit nature of the transaction and vague delineations of corruption that oversimplify the act. Nonetheless, the struggle to fight corruption continues until the day the vice will be overcome. Strengthening the enforcement of laws on corruption remains significant. Some of the strategies for fighting corruption explored in this essay can be among the best that Uganda can use to curbing corruption and its negative effects (if effectively implemented) by the government. Researchers have increasingly engaged in studies that aim at among others: defining corruption, its causes, theories, perspectives, and approaches, complexity of corruption, anti-corruption strategies among others using country cases, but further research will need more empirical studies to be conducted using particular case studies for public use. This study has only attempted to systematically review significant literature on suggested strategies for fighting public sector corruption in Uganda to be able to providekey insights, and a basis for other scholars to conduct further empirical studies.

Policy Implication

Issues that concern public sector corruption in any country facing corruption should not be oversimplified because they are directly linked to the society, and cannot be detached from the process of theorizing (thus, theorizing the theory of corruption is important). But the use of theories alone to identify and explain definitions of corruption and causes among others is misleading. Policy makers must avoid the oversimplification of corruption and related literature. Corruption trends continue to change with the changing environments. Thus, any efforts to curb corruption in governments must focus on structuring strong social values, norms and beliefs coupled with instituting and respecting standard operating procedures. This will help build an effective and efficient public sector management options, warranting creative participation, exposure of hidden interests, and making corruption criminal among other tough measures in place.

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